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Divine Judgment: Judicial Review of
Religious Legal Systems in India and
Israel
By JOSH GOODMAN*

Introduction
In February 2008, Britain's Archbishop of Canterbury stated in
an interview that it "seems unavoidable" that parts of Islamic law,
known as sharia, should be applied to Muslims in the United
Kingdom in the interest of social cohesion.' A firestorm of public
controversy ensued. 2 A similar row erupted in Canada in 2005, as
the province of Ontario considered authorizing voluntary, shariabased family law arbitration. 3
Such conflicts over the
accommodation of religious norms within secular, democratic legal
systems are likely to become increasingly common. Despite the
conventional wisdom that modernization and secularism go hand in
hand, scholars have pointed to a global resurgence in religious belief
and religious identification in recent years, especially with respect to
fervent forms of religion and advocacy of religious politics. 4 This
* Josh Goodman is a J.D. graduate of Harvard Law School and an associate at
Shearman & Sterling LLP. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone.
The author would like to thank Ran Hirschl and Miriam Weiler for many helpful
recommendations.
1. Sharia Law in UK is "Unavoidable," BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7232661.stm.
See Interview by Christopher
Landau with Dr. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573, for a full transcript of
the Archbishop's speech.
2. Id.
3. Ontario Premier rejects use of Shariah law, CBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2005, available
at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/09/09/sharia-protests-20050909.html.
The Ontario proposal was ultimately rejected. Interestingly, similar sharia and
Jewish law arbitrators already operate in the United Kingdom. See id.
4. See generally THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND
WORLD POLMCS (Peter L. Berger ed., Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1999).
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religious resurgence, coupled with the increasing mobility and
migration of global populations, suggests that Western liberal
democracies will have populations that are increasingly religious
and from increasingly diverse religious backgrounds. As a result,
there will be social and political pressure in these states to revisit
questions about the relationship between religion and the state that
had previously seemed settled, and to create new legal structures
that recognize certain religious claims. This paper analyzes and
compares how two democratic states, Israel and India, incorporate
discrete spheres of religious law into their secular legal systems. It
argues that, contrary to the Archbishop's view, the incorporation of
religious law into secular legal systems can undermine the authority
of the secular legal system and erode the social cohesion that
promotes effective democracy.
The relationship between religion and state is a foundational,
constitution-level question. Liberal democratic states based on
secular principles of governance have adopted various different
religion-state arrangements.
One obvious arrangement is the United States' model of strong
secularism, featuring a relatively robust separation between church
and state, 5 but this is not the only model. The United Kingdom, for
example, has an official state church, and many other European
countries do as well, although the influence of these state churches
on the government is often low. 6
Another model for
7
accommodating religion, which I will call religious legal pluralism,

contemplates that religious norms may be given some official legal
status in particular areas of law - for example, in the family law
disputes of religious adherents - within a broader secular, civil
framework. Religious legal pluralism is an appropriate description
for these legal regimes that admit multiple, hybrid, and sometimes
overlapping and conflicting bodies and systems of law. The sharia
proposals for Canada and the United Kingdom would have been
examples of religious legal pluralism, although those proposals
were controversial, in part, because those countries' traditional
5. There are, of course, debates about how robust the separation between
church and state really is under U.S. law. Secularism in the United States and other
countries is discussed in comparative perspective below.
6. For example, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Liechenstein, Monaco, and others
have established churches.
7. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155 (2007).
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methods for accommodating religion and state are based more on
separation than on pluralist recognition.8 India and Israel, however,
are two democratic states that, for historical reasons, have employed
religious legal pluralism since their independence.
In these
countries, certain matters of personal law are governed by the law of
an individual's religious community, rather than by secular, civil
laws. Personal law, generally, refers to questions of family law,
inheritance, and personal status.
In 1947-1948, as India and Israel emerged from British rule
and established themselves as independent nation-states, both
countries preserved existing religious-based systems of personal
laws as a compromise with religious elements of society. The
leadership of both countries at the time of their national
independence and for some time afterward was secular and
moderately socialist in orientation, believing in the inevitable
progression and triumph of the state, and probably that the political
process would provide for the eventual elimination or reform of
these religion-based legal spheres during the state-building process. 9
However, the opposite social trend developed: Forces
promoting religious politics have grown more powerful in both
countries in recent decades. Unable to reform the religious personal
laws through the legislative process, the more secular-oriented
forces in Israeli and Indian society have turned instead to
constitutionalism and the courts to attempt to achieve these
outcomes judicially. The purpose of this paper is to examine how
this conflict of secular and religious legal norms has played out in
the Israeli and Indian civil courts, and to draw out lessons from
these countries' experiences with religious legal pluralism. These
lessons will be of particular relevance for proposals to introduce
religious legal pluralism into liberal, democratic states, because
defenders of such proposals often offer judicial review by civil
courts as a means to safeguard established civil rights from
infringement by religious law.10
8. Of course, much of the controversy can also be attributed specifically to
fears about Islam and Sharia in particular, rather than de-secularization and
recognition of religious claims by law in general.
9. See discussion infra Parts I.A., I.B.
10. See CBC News, Ontario Report Criticized by Shariah Opponents, CBC.cA, Dec.
20,
2004,
available
at
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2004/12/20/sharia-boyd041220.html
(author of proposal to introduce Sharia says "safeguards in place that allow all
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Part I of this paper will discuss different models of religious
accommodation, and the current status and historical origins of state
accommodation of religion in India and Israel, describing, in
particular, the operation of each country's system of religious
personal laws. Part II will analyze specifically how the civil courts
of each country have exercised the power of judicial review over
matters of religion and state, especially with respect to the personal
laws.
Part III will draw comparative conclusions about the ability of
judicial review to protect principles of secularism from religious
pressures. This part will first examine why questions of religion
and state are being increasingly answered by courts, then it will
assess the limits of judicial power in this area, and finally it will turn
to conclusions for states that are considering introducing elements
of religious pluralism into their legal systems.
This paper argues that although the judiciaries in India and
Israel generally issue rulings supporting secularism, they have only
a limited ability to resist trends that dominate majoritarian politics,
including the pressures of religious constituencies, without losing
legitimacy and power.
Therefore, states that are generally
committed to principles of secular governance and law should be
wary about introducing elements of religious law into their legal
systems, because in cases where civil legal principles conflict with
religious mandates, regular civil courts may have difficulty
upholding and enforcing the civil law.
I. Religion and State: Models for Accommodation
In recent years, the law in many democratic, constitutional
states has converged around common understandings of the content
of many basic civil, political, and human rights. Nevertheless, when
it comes to freedom of religion - and more generally, the
relationship between religion and state - the different arrangements
that exist in the democratic world remain highly idiosyncratic,
reflecting diverse histories and religious traditions. Despite these
variations, however, it is still possible to identify a few basic models
of accommodation of religion in states that follow principles of
secular, democratic governance. 1
parties the right to appeal to the courts.").
11. The following framework is suggested by Ran Hirschl. Of course, there are
other possible arrangements of religion and state outside the democratic world. In
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First, there is the strong secularism or laYcit6 model. Exemplary
states in this category include the United States, France, and Turkey.
Under the pure form of this model, individuals have private
religious freedom and religion plays no role in the affairs of state
governance, and vice versa. However, in practical terms, all states
that aspire to secularism have reached different legal arrangements
in enforcing the separation between church and state and providing
for private religious freedom; no state can be considered perfectly
secular or can provide for complete free exercise of religious beliefs.
In the United States, the First Amendment to the constitution
prohibits the government from establishing an official religion and
from preventing the free exercise of religion. 12 In general, U.S.
government policies may not favor, promote, or fund any religion,
although in some circumstances, limited government support is
provided to religious organizations, for example through tax breaks
or through "Charitable Choice," which allows government funding
of faith-based social service initiatives. 13 The United States also
tends to provide greater protection for free exercise than France or
Turkey, as detailed below.
In France, Article I of the constitution describes France as a
secular state and establishes the principle of la'cit6 and respect for
all beliefs. 14 By tradition, religion, including religious expression by
public figures, has little or no role in public life or public affairs.
This approach to secularism has resulted in bans on common forms
of religious expression in certain circumstances, such as the wellknown 2004 law banning Islamic headscarves, Jewish skullcaps,
large Christian crosses, and other prominent displays of religious
affiliation in public schools. 15 This approach would likely be
Saudi Arabia and Iran, different varieties of Islam are clearly established as official
state religions and are coercively enforced through the legal system. In Egypt,
Article 2 of the Constitution was amended in 1980 to establish Sharia as the source
of law, but the state's Supreme Constitutional Court, rather than religious
authorities, has the power to interpret the meaning of disputed Sharia matters. See
Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism:Three Middle Eastern
Tales, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1819, 1820-34 (2004).
12. U.S. CONST. amend I.
13. See Judith B. Goodman, Charitable Choice: The Ramifications of Government
Fundingfor Faith-BasedHealth Care Services, 26 NOVA L. REV. 563 (2002).
14. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) ("France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic
and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.").
15. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 17, 2004, Journal Officiel de la RCpublique
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unconstitutional in the United States due to protections granted by
the Free Exercise clause.
In Turkey, secularism is specifically mentioned in the
constitution as a founding pillar of the state. 16 Secularism is
considered one of the defining characteristics of modern Turkey, as
opposed to its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, which defined
itself as an Islamic caliphate. Overt religiosity in Turkish public
institutions, even by private individuals, is discouraged and, in
some cases, prohibited. In a recent, well-known case, a Turkish
student who was banned from wearing an Islamic headscarf in a
public university claimed that Turkey violated the guarantee of
freedom of religion contained in the European Convention on
Human Rights, but the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
Turkey had a sufficiently compelling reason for the ban. 17 On the
other hand, the Turkish government also organizes, subsidizes, and
supervises all Sunni Muslim religious institutions, but it purports to
do so in the interest of upholding secularism. 18 Thus, Turkey has
been accused of violating the principle of secularism with respect to
both individual freedom and state involvement in religious affairs.
The differences between France, Turkey and the United States
illustrate how idiosyncratic religion-state arrangements can be, even
among states that purport to be overwhelmingly secular.
A second model of state accommodation of religion can be
termed weak establishment. Under this model, a particular religion
is recognized as having an official or special status, but individuals
still retain full religious freedom in the private sphere, and the state
religion in general does not play much of a role in governance.
Examples of states in this category include the United Kingdom,
where the Church of England is the official state church, and
Norway, where the Church of Norway is official. 19
Finally, there is the model of religious legal pluralism. Under
this model, within a generally secular state (based on either strong
secularism or weak establishment), religion is granted special status
Fran~aise U.O.1 [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004.
16. Constitution of Republic of Turkey preamble and art. 2 ("The Republic of
Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state").
17. Sahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2007) (Grand Chamber).
18. These activities are carried out by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. See
http://www.diyanet.gov.tr.
19. For other examples, see supra note 6.
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or authority within discrete spheres of law. The two most notable
examples in this category are the subject of this paper: Israel and
India. Both of these countries are democracies based on principles
of secular law and secular governance, but both recognize religious
law as governing certain matters of personal law.
To illustrate, when a Muslim gets divorced in India, the courts
apply a version of Islamic law to the case, but when a Hindu gets
divorced, a Hindu-based law is applied. Similarly, when a Jewish
couple in Israel gets divorced, they must go to a rabbinical court that
applies Jewish law with binding legal power, but when a Muslim
couple gets divorced, they would go to a Muslim court of similar
standing.
There are other examples of states that employ similar systems.
In South Africa, the constitution instructs courts to apply the
"customary law" of tribal groups where applicable, subject to rights
established in the constitution and other legislation. 20 In the United
States, which is generally recognized as having separation of church
and state, Native American tribal courts, which may base their
rulings and procedures in tribal religious traditions, possess
recognized legal jurisdiction over the members of native tribes. 21
Malaysia, although not a secular state, maintains a dual system of
secular and Islamic courts, 22 and there are other examples that can
be found, for example, in Africa. 23
The operation of religious law within an overall secular state
has been described as creating a type of multicultural or
differentiated citizenship in which individuals possess different
religious and cultural group-based legal rights. 24
From the
20. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 211.
21. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
22. Although Malaysia ostensibly guarantees freedom of religion in its
constitution, Malaysia, whose official religion is Sunni Islam, deploys religious
police to enforce Islamic rules on Muslims, and according to the U.S. State
Department International Religious Freedom Report, the state has monitored "the
activities of the Shi'a minority, and the Government periodically [has] detained
members of what it considers Islamic 'deviant sects' without trial or charge under
the Internal Security Act (ISA)." International Religious Freedom Report: Malaysia,
U.S.
DEP'T.
OF
STATE,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13899.htm.
23. See Tiernan Mennan, Legal Pluralism in Southern Sudan: Can the Rest of Africa
Show the Way?, 3 AFR. POL'Y J. (2007) (discussing legal pluralism in Mozambique,
South Africa, and Ghana).
24. See Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 32:2

perspective of the strong version of secularism, multicultural legal
pluralism may be seen as violating basic liberal, secular tenets of
universal citizenship and complete equality before the law. Modern
understandings of human rights may be violated by legally imposed
religious precepts.
For example, many of the controversies
generated by legal pluralism involve conflicts between legal rights
to gender equality and traditional mandates of religious law (for
example, the treatment of women under Islamic divorce law).
Nevertheless, it is not clear that religious legal pluralism
necessarily constitutes a violation of liberal principles. Indeed, some
modem political thinkers believe legal pluralism may further liberal
principles of tolerance and autonomy. 25 For example, where the
ostensibly secular public culture and laws of the state clearly reflect
the values, beliefs, and practices of the dominant religious group in
society, as is the case in many countries, the pluralist model may
allow religious minority groups spheres of autonomy in which they
have official legal authority and protection to develop and maintain
26
their own traditions.
Legal pluralism may also function to mediate conflicts between
and among members of different religious groups in society. 27 For
example, Israeli Muslims are subject to sharia family law provisions
that would never be enacted as generally applicable laws by Israel's
legislature, due to its Jewish majority; thus, this pluralist
arrangement may reduce a potential source of social conflict and
provide the Muslim community with some autonomy from
dominant Israeli cultural norms. Critics of legal pluralism, however,
would claim that it perpetuates inter-religious conflicts by
undermining equality, reducing social cohesion, and undermining a
shared sense of civic identity.28 The debate over the value of legal
pluralism often boils down to questions about the nature of society:
Whether society is composed only of individuals or of groups as
well, what rights groups should possess, to what extent legal
frameworks themselves have the effect of constituting society, and

Pieces of JurisdictionalAuthority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 387 (2000).
25. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
26. See Shachar, supra note 24; see also id. at 27.
27. See id.
28. See generally BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE
OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001).
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vice versa.
Answering these fundamental, theoretical questions about the
merits of legal pluralism is beyond the scope of this paper, which
focuses on understanding and evaluating the experiences of the
Indian and Israeli Supreme Courts in resolving conflicts between
secular and religious claims to legal authority.
A. Religious Legal Pluralism in India
India is a country with an enormous population of more than
one billion people, and is home to a great number of different
religious traditions including Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism,
Christianity, Sikhism, Jainism, and others. Hinduism and Islam are
the two most common religions, representing 80.5 percent and 13.4
percent of the population respectively. 29 Modern India is a secular
state with no official state religion, but whose public culture has
been significantly shaped by religion, and which maintains specific
spheres of religious legal pluralism in its personal law.
Historically, various empires ruled over parts of India, but local
communities generally operated as autonomous legal jurisdictions
living by their own traditions and customs, despite the religion of
the imperial ruler.30 In 1772, Warren Hastings, the first GovernorGeneral of British India, introduced various legal reforms
establishing a uniform criminal code (based mostly on Islamic law),
and providing that "in all suits regarding marriage, inheritance, the
laws of the Koran with respect to Mohammedans, and those of the
31
Shastras with respect to [Hindus] shall be invariably adhered to."
Thus the model of enclaves of religious personal law within a
broader, uniform national legal system was introduced in India.
Initially, British colonial judges appointed Hindu and Muslim
experts to help them decide matters involving religious personal
law, but eventually these experts were eliminated and the judges
interpreted the personal law on their own.32 Since both Hinduism
and Islam contain a great diversity of traditions and customs, the
29. CIA WORLD FAcrBOOK: INDIA (2001 census figures).
30. GERALD JAMES LARSON, Introduction: The Secular State in a Religious Society, in
RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA 5 (Gerald James Larson ed., 2001).
31. SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH & LLOYD I. RUDOLPH, Living with Difference in
India, in RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA 39 (Gerald James Larson ed.,
2001).
32. LARSON, supra note 30.
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personal law administered by the British represented only one
particular subset of religious interpretations that gained authority
through the colonial legal system, and then continued to develop
through case law and reforms. 33 The consolidation of Hindu law
and Muslim law into only two systems, therefore, represented a
significant centralization of the previously existing systems of
religious law in these communities. 34
According to Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph,
the early British governors of India who ruled from 1772-1828 saw
the subcontinent as composed of a constellation of different,
autonomous cultural groups, each embodying distinct and valuable
civilizations. 35 These governors ruled accordingly, creating legal
structures that recognized religious and caste groups as the basis of
society. 36 By contrast, the later British governors were liberal,
utilitarian individualists who believed in universal progress and the
emancipation of the individual, and saw little value in preserving
local customs, religion, and culture. 37 Not surprisingly, however,
these later British rulers associated universal progress with the
achievements of English and European culture. Thomas Babington
Macaulay, who served on the governing council in India from 1834
to 1838 and who made English the official language of instruction in
Indian colleges instead of Sanskrit and Arabic, 38 wrote that "all the
historical information which has been collected from all the books
written in the Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be
found in the most paltry abridgments used at preparatory schools in
39
England."
The elite class of anglicized Indians subsequently educated by
the later British colonial system largely founded the Indian National
Congress, 40 the secular nationalist party that led the struggle for
33. Id.
34. RUDOLPH, supra note 31, at 52.
35. Id. at 39-42.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. These are the traditional literary and sacred languages in Hinduism and
Islam, not the vernacular languages of Indian Hindus and Muslims.
39. RUDOLPH, supra note 31, at 39-42 (quoting THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY,
Minute of 2 February1835 on Indian Education, in MACAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY 72124, 729, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1957), available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1833macaulay-india.htnl.
40. Id.
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Indian independence and dominated Indian politics for many years
after independence was achieved in 1947.
The Congress Party sought to create a unified, majoritarian,
secular, democratic state around the one-nation theory of Indian
nationalism, in contrast to the two-nation theory that held that
Indian Muslims and Hindus constituted different nations that
needed different independent states. Muslim wariness of
majoritarian democracy in India derived in part from the fact that
the Muslim community stood to lose more than the Hindu
community in such an arrangement because Muslims were a
numerical minority. Eventually, the subcontinent was partitioned in
1947 into two states: India, defined as a secular state, and Pakistan,
defined as an Islamic state. Despite massive migrations of Muslims
from India to Pakistan, India still retained a substantial Muslim
population.
In independent India, the new state, led by Prime Minister
Jawarhalal Nehru and the Congress Party, tried as much as possible
to reform Indian society around the vision of a secular, nationalist,
moderately socialist state. Religion-based allocations of seats in
government bodies, which had been introduced in the British era,
were eliminated. 41 While some politicians had advocated
eliminating the distinct personal law systems as well, the
Constituent Assembly did not go that far, fearing a conflict with the
Muslim community, whose leaders supported maintaining the
religious law. Instead, a compromise was reached.
The Indian constitution expresses the aspiration of eliminating
the religious personal law in favor of a uniform legal code, but does
not take any concrete legal steps toward doing so. Article 44 of the
constitution reads: "The State shall endeavour to secure for the
42
citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India."
This article is in a section of the constitution that lists "Directive
Principles of State Policy," which are to guide the state in
lawmaking, but which are not actually enforceable in court. 43
Article 25 of the Indian constitution provides freedom of
religion. It reads, in pertinent part: "[A]ll persons are equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,

41. Id. at 48.
42. INDIA CONST. art. 44.
43. See id. art. 37.
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practise and propagate religion." 44 Yet additional clauses of the
same article specify that "Nothing in this article shall... prevent the
State from making any law... providing for social welfare and
reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a
public character to all classes and sections of Hindus," 45 which in
46
this context includes Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains (but not Muslims).
Thus, freedom of religion is constitutionally subordinated in
India to the state's responsibility for social reform, and specifically
for the reform of the Hindu society, which historically featured a
rigid system of social inequality based on caste. Gary Jacobsohn
sees secularism under the Indian constitution as "ameliorative" in
nature: "[T]he Constitution seeks an amelioration of the social
conditions of people long burdened by the inequities of religiously
based hierarchies, but also embodies a vision of intergroup comity
whose fulfillment necessitates cautious deliberation in the pursuit of
abstract justice." 47 Under this concept of ameliorative secularism,
the Muslim community's exemption from the religious reforms of
the constitution (evidenced by the lack of a reference to Muslims in
Article 25, as well as Article 44's failure to abolish the religiousbased personal laws due to Muslim concerns) becomes, for Hindu
critics, a rejection of the social reform, progress, and modernization
identified as the agenda of the independent Indian state. From the
perspective of many in the Muslim community, however, this need
for social reform was rooted in Hindu caste inequalities, and the
preservation of the Islamic personal laws, spelled shariat in India,
becomes identified with the preservation of Muslim community
rights in a Hindu-dominated state. These clashing perspectives lay
at the heart of many post-independence religion-state conflicts in
India.
In the early years of Indian independence, the parliament
enacted a wide-ranging reform of the Hindu - but not the Muslim personal laws. These "Hindu Code" reforms introduced secular
legal concepts into the Hindu personal law by promoting equality of
caste and gender, introducing divorce, and endorsing the nuclear

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. art. 25, cl.1.
Id. art. 25, cl. 2.
Id. art. 25, cl. 2, explanation II.

GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA'S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT (2003).
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family. 48 Thus, reform of the Hindu Code in India was intimately
linked with the overall project of Indian social reform and progress
initiated in the constitution. 49 The independent Indian parliament
assumed the moral authority to reform and reshape Hindu society,
eliminating past inequities. 50 The Hindu Code reforms were
initially envisioned as part of the process of creating a uniform civil
code, but legislative consensus on reforming the shariat could not be
reached.51 Nehru, speaking in 1954, said of adopting a uniform civil
code reform at that time: "I do not think that at the present moment
the time is ripe in India for me to try to push it through."5 2 Thus, the
last colonial-era codification of Muslim Law, The Muslim Personal
Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 remains in effect.
The uniform civil code provision and the lack of reform in the
shariat quickly became a central point in subsequent debates and
controversies over religion and secularism in India. This secularreligious struggle focuses on the appropriate nature of the
relationship of the state with its constituent religious communities,
and whether the state ought to recognize communities at all. It is a
site of conflict between the Muslim community's attempts to
preserve their cultural autonomy on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, the attempts of both bona fide universalist, secularists and
particularistic, Hindu nationalists to eliminate legal pluralism in
India. Because eliminating legal pluralism in India has proved
impossible through the legislature, courts have become the primary
battleground for this struggle.
B. Religious Legal Pluralismin Israel
Unlike in India, where ordinary civil judges have long
interpreted the different religious-based codes of law, each
recognized religious community in Israel maintains its own
independent religious court system to apply and interpret religious
law. These religious courts, financed by the state, have jurisdiction

48. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law Systems and Religious
Conflict: A Comparison of India and Israel, in RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR
INDIA 273 (Gerald James Larson ed., Indiana University Press 2001).
49. See JACOBSOHN, supra note 47, at 285.
50. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 48, at 273.
51. See Subrata Kumar Mitra, Desecularisingthe State: Religion and Politics in India
after Independence, 33 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. AND HIST., 755, 770 (1991).
52. Quoted in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1531.
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over certain matters of personal status, such as marriage and
divorce. 53 There are fourteen recognized religious communities in
Israel: Jews, Muslims, Druze, Bahai, and ten Christian
denominations. 54 The religious composition of Israel, which has a
population of roughly 6.5 million, is 76.4 percent Jewish, 16 percent
Muslim, and roughly 2 percent Christian and 2 percent Druze. 55
The majority of the Jewish population in Israel is not religiously
observant, but nevertheless all Israelis are subject to the religious
courts of their community.
The origins of the Israeli personal law system lie in the Ottoman
Empire, which ruled the area until 1917. Under the Ottoman millet
system, each religious community constituted a self-regulating
jurisdictional unit with substantial internal autonomy to make laws
and administer justice. As with the British in India, this pluralist
legal system enabled the Ottomans to manage a vast empire made
up of a large number of diverse religious communities historically
accustomed to living by their own traditions.
The British took over Palestine after the Ottoman Empire's
defeat in World War I, and ruled the area under a League of Nations
Mandate until 1948, when Israel became an independent state. The
Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922, which served as the
constitutional document of the British Mandate, preserved the millet
system for personal law matters. It retained independent religious
courts with jurisdictional authority over personal status questions
involving their community members. 56 Personal status cases were
defined as "Suits Regarding Marriage Or Divorce, Alimony,
Maintenance, Guardianship, Legitimation And Adoption Of Minors,
Inhibition From Dealing With Property Of Persons Who Are Legally
Incompetent, Successions, Wills And Legacies, And The
Administration Of The Property Of Absent Persons."5 7 In another

53. SHIMON SHETREET,
(Springer 1994).
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54. MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 51 (University
Press of Virginia 1994).
55. Central Intelligence Agency, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: ISRAEL, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html
(last-updated on Feb. 24, 2009).
56. Palestine Order-in-Council, art. 51, Aug. 10, 1922, available at
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/361eealcc08301c485256cf600606959/c7aae
196f41aa055052565f50054e656!OpenDocument.
57. Id. art. 51.
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stroke of legal pluralism, the British also formed Bedouin tribal
courts to handle disputes among Bedouin tribes in the Negev desert
area according to their customs. 58 As was the case under the former
Ottoman system, the Muslim courts in Mandatory Palestine had the
widest jurisdictional scope, with authority over all personal status
matters as defined above, while Jewish and Christian courts had
exclusive jurisdiction only over "marriage and divorce, alimony and
59
confirmation of wills of [religious community] members."
At the time of Israel's independence in 1948, the secular,
Zionist, moderately socialist Mapai (Labor) party dominated
politics, but it nevertheless sought the support of religious elements
of society. Just prior to independence, David Ben Gurion, the leader
of the Mapai faction and Israel's first prime minister, had reached a
compromise with the Jewish religious parties. Known as the "status
quo" agreement, this compromise guaranteed Mapai's support for
the Jewish rabbinical authorities' preferences on a number of
political issues, including maintaining the personal law courts,
establishing religious schools, and respecting the Jewish Sabbath
and dietary (kosher) laws in state institutions. 60 Thus, the actual
sphere of religious authorities' power, at least for the Jewish
community, extends a bit further than the personal law, and is
implemented by an officially recognized religious body, the Chief
Rabbinate of Israel. The Chief Rabbinate of Israel, established by the
British during the Mandate period, has official responsibility for
certification of kosher products and supervision of Jewish holy sites,
and it plays a role in overseeing the rabbinical court system, for
example, by determining the eligibility of rabbinical judges and
61
issuing interpretations of Jewish law, known as halakha.
Although secularists like Ben Gurion dominated the leadership
of the Zionist movement, the "status quo" compromise served
several important functions for these secular leaders: It gained the
political support of religious parties for Mapai leadership in the
future government; it avoided provoking conflict and disunity
among the Jewish community, a key objective in light of the military
and national security dangers posed by Arab opposition to Israel;
58. Id. art. 45.
59. Id. arts. 53-54.
60. EDELMAN, supra note 54, at 51.
61. See nnw-i-T w ii n -in [Chief Rabbinate's Website], http://www.dat.
gov.il.
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and it provided enhanced legitimacy for Zionism, which, although
primarily a secular-nationalist movement at this time, drew on
62
Jewish history and religious tradition.
A Constituent Assembly was convened in 1948 and charged
with drafting a written constitution for Israel, but a constitution was
never adopted. 63 Instead, the Constituent Assembly reconstituted
itself as Israel's parliament, the Knesset, and the drafting of a
comprenhensive written constitution was postponed indefinitely in
favor of adopting a series of Basic Laws.64 Thus, there is no formal
written constitution in Israel, but there are several Basic Laws which
outline the state's governmental structures and provide for the
rights of citizens. The Knesset has the power to create Basic Laws,
and also retains the power to enact a formal constitution at any time.
Israel has been defined as a "Jewish and democratic state" in its
Basic Laws, 65 but exactly what it means to be a "Jewish state" is
unclear. Judaism is not technically considered an official state
religion, and private religious freedom is an individual right
recognized by the Supreme Court.66 Traditionally, Judaism, in
contrast to Christianity and Islam, encompasses elements of a
particular national or ethnic identity - the idea of the "Jewish
people" - as well as personal faith, beliefs, and ritual practices.
Thus, the most general understanding of Israel as a Jewish state is as
a homeland for the "Jewish people." Israel is not a theocracy, as
religious precepts do not generally enter into governance; the state
is governed by the democratically elected legislature. However,
given the unique and privileged status of Judaism in Israel, the
country can probably best be described as a secular state with a
"weak" religious establishment and spheres of religious legal
pluralism in personal law.
A series of post-independence Israeli laws have modified the
legal authority of the religious courts. In 1953, the Knesset
narrowed the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts to

62. Id. at 51-52.
63. For further discussion on this point, see Roundtable: Israel Constitutionalism,6
YALE ISRAEL J. 25 (2005).
64. Id. at 9.
65. See Basic Law:
Human
Dignity
and
Liberty, available
at
http://www.knesset. gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
66. See HCJ 5073/91 Israel Theatres v. Municipality of Netanya, 47 (3) PD 192.
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questions of marriage and divorce. 67 The Knesset also reformed the
judicial appointments process and the appeals structure of the
rabbinical courts to bring them in line with the norms in the civil
system.68 However, the courts of the other religions were not as
significantly modified, and so, for example, the sharia courts of Israel
still have the widest jurisdictional scope of all Israeli religious
courts, with authority over all personal status questions for Israeli
69
Muslim citizens.
Although the Knesset preserved the autonomy and integrity of
the religious legal authorities and did not undertake wholesale
reform of religious law, like the Hindu Code laws did in India, the
Knesset did pass several civil laws intended to provide indirect
solutions to certain perceived inequities in the religious laws. For
example, the Women's Equal Rights Law 1951 and the Succession
Law 1965 apply to all citizens and are intended to remedy
shortcomings in the personal laws, even though they do not directly
apply to those laws. The success of these equal rights laws, and
other subsequent laws, upon matters touching the personal law has
been somewhat mixed due to the autonomy of the religious court
system and the view, internal to that system, that their authority
derives from religion and not the state. 70 As in India, the battlefields
where these conflicts between secular and religious legal norms are
fought have moved more toward the courtroom and away from the
legislative chamber.
II. Secular Judicial Management of
Religious Legal Systems in India and Israel
In both Israel and India, the maintenance of the personal law
systems by the secular, modernizing, post-independence leadership
represented a political compromise necessary to achieve the higher
end of national unity to establish the state. In both countries,
however, the personal law systems have endured, and have served
to reinforce religious identity as an important element of citizenship
and to perpetuate certain illiberal outcomes that are dictated by
67. EDELMAN, supra note 54, at 52-53.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Anat Scolnicov, Religious Law, Religious Courts, and Human Rights within
the Israeli Constitutional Structure, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 734 (2006) (discussing the
religious courts' claims to non-secular authority). See further discussion infra.
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religious law. With personal law reform unavailable through the
legislative process due to political deadlock, yet desired by
significant segments of society, the secular courts of India and Israel
have acted, within limits, to secularize and homogenize the national
law by overseeing and restraining the authority of religious law
through a variety of mechanisms.
A. India
1. Background: The Indian Judiciaryand ConstitutionalLaw
Before delving into India's judicial management of religious
law, it is first necessary to understand India's constitutional
structure and the powers of its Supreme Court.
During the first two decades of Indian independence, the
Indian Supreme Court was highly deferential to the legislature,
rarely holding that legislative acts were unconstitutional except in a
handful of property rights cases. 71 In the late 1960s, however, the
Court began to assert itself more forcefully on questions of
fundamental rights. According to Article 13(2) of the Indian
constitution, "[tihe State shall not make any law which takes away
72
or abridges" the fundamental rights described in the constitution.
Part III of the Indian constitution, comprising articles 13-35, is a bill
of fundamental rights, including rights to equality before the law,
non-discrimination of the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, or place
of birth, freedom of speech, and many others. Article 13 provides
the foundation for rights-based judicial review of legislation for
constitutionality by the Supreme Court of India.
In the major 1967 case of Golaknath v. Punjab,73 the Supreme
Court held that constitutional amendments themselves, which can
be enacted by super-majority vote of both chambers of the Indian
parliament, were considered "law" under Article 13(2), and that
therefore constitutional amendments were subject to judicial review
by the court to make sure they did not take away or abridge
fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution. 74 The idea that
the court could limit the legislature's power to amend the
71. See S. P SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND
ENFORCING LIMITS 52 (2002).
72. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA art. 13, cl. 2.
73. Golaknath v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
74. SATHE, supra note 71, at 65.
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constitution itself was seen as a radical expansion of judicial power,
and the decision was highly controversial. 75 The facts of the case in
Golaknath involved a challenge to amendments that were held to
infringe basic property rights. Politically, the Supreme Court was
viewed as opposing the redistributive economic policies of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, Jawarhalal Nehru's daughter and his
successor as the leader of the Congress Party. 76 After the Congress
Party won an overwhelming majority in the 1971 elections for the
Lok Sabha, India's lower house of parliament, the government
challenged the court by introducing the 24th amendment, which
was intended to overrule Golaknath and reinstate parliament's
77 Of
power to amend the constitution without judicial oversight.
course, this amendment too was challenged in court, leading to the
78
landmark 1973 case of KesavanandaBharativ. Kerala.
In Kesavananda Bharati, the court technically overruled
Golaknath, by upholding the validity of the 24th amendment and
overturning the doctrine that amendments were subject to review
under article 13(2). Nevertheless, the court preserved its essential
power to review constitutional amendments for validity under a
different framework. 79 The court held that amendments and other
laws which violated or attempted to change the "basic structure" or
80
"basic features" of the Indian constitution would be held invalid.
The response of the legislature to this ruling was the 42nd
amendment, passed in 1976, which attempted to reverse this "basic
structure" doctrine. However, the court voided the provisions of
the 42nd amendment that contradicted the basic structure doctrine,
and the doctrine has since remained established in Indian
jurisprudence.81 The 42nd amendment also attempted to define
specific elements of the basic structure of the Indian state and
constitution by reference to the "high ideals of socialism, secularism
and the integrity of the nation." The court has since held that

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
1789.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, 1973 A.I.R. S.C. 1461.
See SATHE, supra note 71, at 70.
Kesavananda Bharati, 1973 A.I.R. S.C. 1461, 315.
SATHE, supra note 71, at 87; see also Minerva Mills v. India, 1980 A.I.R. S.C.
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secularism is indeed part of the basic structure of the constitution.8 2
2. Secularism in Indian Society
The rulings of the Supreme Court of India on the question of
personal law have, on the whole, attempted to expand its vision of
secularism in Indian law.
What secularism means in India,
however, is a question that sparks great debate.
When speaking about the meaning of secularism in Indian
society and law, it is possible to identify three different visions of
secularism. First, there is the "neutral," universalist vision of
secularism, 83 which corresponds most closely to the strong
secularism concept discussed above in reference to the United
States, France, and Turkey. This vision of secularism may also link
secularism to social progress, modernization and the unification of
the Indian state, as illustrated by Jawarhalal Nehru's statements that
"[r]eligion is a hindrance to the tendency to change and progress
inherent in human society," and that "the belief in a supernatural
agency which ordains everything has led to a certain irresponsibility
on the social plane, and emotion and sentimentality have taken the
place of reasoned thought and inquiry." s4 According to this brand
of secularism, the personal laws in India should be abolished and
replaced with a religiously neutral, uniform civil code, as envisioned
by Article 44 of the Indian constitution.
Second, there is the populist vision of secularism associated
with Hindu right-wing parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party
("BJP," or the Indian People's Party). The BJP advocate for a
uniform civil code for India, but do so with the understanding that
such a code will reflect the perspectives of the dominant Hindu
majority. 85 Their ideology is based on the concept of Hindutva,
which refers to the idea that "Hinduness" ought to underlie Indian

82. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 A.I.R. S.C. 1918.
83. Of course, secularism may not be neutral from the perspective of the
religious members of society because it may place burdens on religious practice, as
illustrated by the headscarf bans in France and Turkey. However, the relevant
distinction in the Indian context is between those who support secularism because
they support liberal, universalism and a neutral attitude of the state toward all
religions, and those in the Hindu nationalist camp who support secularism because
the laws of a majority Hindu state will likely reflect traditional Hindu norms or
identity.
84. Mitra, supra note 51, at 765 n.20.
85. See JACOBSOHN, supranote 47, at 110.
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identity, although they contend that Hindutva refers to an idea of
Indian civilization that is not religiously exclusive.86 This last
contention may seem strange, and the genuineness of its proponents
has been challenged, but it derives from the idea, internal to Hindu
discourse, that Hinduism is non-dogmatic and based on the diverse
87
traditions of the Indian subcontinent.
Third, there is the "equal respect" secularism of the status quo
in India, in which members of different religious communities are
afforded some legal recognition and autonomy through the personal
law. This vision can be considered consistent with Nehru's
statement that "[a] secular state does not mean an irreligious state: it
only means that we respect and honor all religions and give them
the freedom to function." 88 In this vision of secularism, the state is
generally secular, and personal laws act to protect the minority
religion and culture from being subjected to the religiously derived
norms of the majority community.
The Indian Supreme Court's decisions have generally endorsed
the first vision of secularism outlined above, consistently agitating
for a neutral, uniform civil code. 89 However, some of its rhetoric 90
and some well-known recent decisions 91 seem to align the court
with the second, Hindu populist version of secularism. 92 In several
rulings involving the personal law, the court appears overtly hostile
to the third, pluralist model, casting it as contrary to the principles
of secularism and in violation of the spirit of the Indian constitution.
However, the court has been hesitant to strike down personal

86. See BJP Manifesto, Chapter 2, available at http://www.bjp.org/
manifes/chap2.htm. (stating that "Every effort to characterize Hindutva as a
sectarian or exclusive idea has failed," yet at the same time declaring the party's
support for the construction of a Hindu temple on a disputed religious site).
87. See infra discussion of the Hindutya cases.
88. Ronojoy Sen, Legalizing Religion: The Indian Supreme Court and
Secularism 5 (East-West Ctr. Wash.) (2007), available at http://www.eastwest
center.org/file admin/stored/pdfs/PS030.pdf.
89. See the discussion in part ii below.
90. Cf.infra note 116 (court in Hariharancommented that "It is not out of place
to mention also that Hindu law being one of the oldest known systems of
jurisprudence has shown no signs of decrepitude and it has its values and
importance even today); with infra note 95 (the Bano court's less than favorable
reference to Muslim law).
91. See infra the Hindutya cases note 109.
92. See supra note 88, at 12 (arguing that "there is a significant overlap between
the judicial discourse and the ontology of Hindu nationalism").
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laws as contrary to the constitution directly, most likely due to the
sensitive political nature of questions of religion and personal law in
India. In some cases, the court has held that the personal laws are
not subject to the fundamental rights in the constitution, 93 but
several recent cases indicate that the personal laws are subject to
fundamental constitutional rights. 94 Nevertheless, the court, in cases
where it clearly believes fundamental rights are in conflict with the
personal law, uses interpretive strategies other than direct judicial
invalidation of the law in question to achieve the desired outcome.
Despite wielding a power of judicial review that is legally more
powerful than in most other countries, the Indian Supreme Court
must still act in the shadow of the legislature and public opinion,
and in the cases where it has forgotten this reality, it has stoked
public controversy and challenges to its legitimacy.
3. The Indian Supreme Court's Personal Law Jurisprudence
The most well-known controversy involving the personal law
in India is the case of Shah Bano.95 Shah Bano was a 62-year-old
Muslim woman who was divorced by her husband of 43 years
through the Muslim practice of talaq, which allows a husband to
immediately, unilaterally divorce his wife. Under the Muslim
personal law, Shah Bano's ex-husband was only obligated to pay her
a small sum of maintenance money during the three months after
the divorce, known as the period of iddat. However, lacking the
resources to support herself and her five children, Shah Bano sought
maintenance payments in the courts. Under Section 125 of India's
Code of Criminal Procedure, a husband may be ordered to pay
maintenance to his wife or ex-wife if she is unable to maintain
herself, but under Section 127 of the same law, this maintenance
order is to be cancelled by the court where the woman has received
the sum due to her under the personal law. 96 Although this case did
not directly raise a constitutional conflict between the personal law
and the right to equality under Article 14 of the constitution, this
concern was obviously on the minds of the Supreme Court justices
when the case eventually reached them.

93. See, e.g., Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 A.I.R. S.C. 707.
94. See VRINDA NARAIN, GENDER AND COMMUNITY: MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN
INDIA 41-43 (2002).
95. Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 A.I.R. S.C. 985.
96. Id.
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The court ruled in favor of Shah Bano. First, it held that that the
right to maintenance under Section 125 was a secular legal right that
could be "exercised irrespective of the personal law of the parties,"
and that "section 125 overrides the personal law, if there is any
conflict between the two." 97 It also rejected the husband's argument
that Section 127 was automatically satisfied by his payment of
dowry (mahr). Those rulings alone could have decided the case, but
the Supreme Court went much further.
In the opening paragraph of the decision, written by Justice
Chandrachaud, a Hindu, the court quotes and endorses a
nineteenth-century British orientalist's view that Islam's treatment
of women constitutes the religion's "fatal point," and suggests that
98
Muslim women are "traditionally subjected to unjust treatment."
The court also embarked on its own novel interpretation of the
shariaby directly analyzing certain verses from the Quran.
Finally, the court sermonized on the need for a uniform civil
code and admonished the state for failing to enact one:
It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our constitution has
remained a dead letter... There is no evidence of any official
activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief
seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community
to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their personal law. A
common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by
removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting
ideologies.... It is the State which is charged with the duty of
securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and,
unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so ....
Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the
courts because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to
allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But
piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal
Laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all
is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice
from case to case.
There are other cases in which the Supreme Court has
attempted to press the government to abolish the personal laws. For
example, in Sarla Mugdal v. Union of India,99 a 1995 case that involved

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Sarla Mugdal v. Union of India, 1995 A.I.R. S.C. 1531.
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married Hindu men who were converting to Islam in order to
practice polygamy, which is legal under the Muslim personal law,
Justice Kuldip Singh wrote:
Those who preferred to remain in India after the partition, fully
knew that the Indian leaders did not believe in two-nation or
three-nation theory and that in the Indian Republic there was to
be one Nation - Indian nation - and no community could claim to
remain a separate entity on the basis of religion.... The
Successive Government till-date have been wholly remiss in their
duty of implementing the constitutional mandate under Article 44
of the Constitution of India. 100
Not surprisingly, the court ruled that the second marriage of a
Hindu convert to Islam would be invalid. 101 The provocative and
politicized judicial pleas for a uniform civil code in this case and in
Shah Bano were effective at stoking significant public controversy in
India, but were fairly counterproductive in achieving their declared
goals of a uniform civil code and national integration.
The ruling in Shah Bano caused an immediate and massive
popular furor to erupt in some parts of the Muslim community that
interpreted the ruling as an attack on their religious rights. The
strident tone of the court's criticism of the personal law, as well as its
critical assessment of Islamic practices, and its attempt to interpret
the Quran on its own initiative, amplified the backlash from the
Muslim community by giving the clear sense that the case was not
just about the rights of maintenance for an impoverished divorcee,
but a judgment on the whole system of Muslim personal law.
In response to the harsh reaction to the ruling among
Muslims, the Congress Party government, led by Rajiv Gandhi,
passed the Muslim Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act
1986, which nullified the ruling in Shah Bano by excluding Muslim
women from Section 125. This Act, in turn, served to agitate many
Hindus and galvanize support for the Hindu right-wing, which
accused the Congress Party of compromising the principles of
secularism in order to appease Islamic fundamentalists and get
Muslim votes.102 The Act specified that "a Muslim divorced woman
shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance

100. Id. 35-36.
101. Id.
102. SATHE, supra note 71, at 192.
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within the period of iddat by her former husband.. ."103
Thus, the Supreme Court's effort to hasten the elimination of
the religious law created a backlash with the opposite result of
further entrenching it in legislation, as well as promoting significant
inter-communal tension in society at large.
Indeed, many
commentators argue that the reaction to Shah Bano and the passage
of the Muslim Women's Act contributed both to the ascent of the
Hindu right, represented by the BJP, in Indian politics, and to the
volatile public atmosphere that led to the notorious destruction of
the historic Babri mosque by Hindu militants at a disputed religious
site in the city of Ayodhya in 1992.104
A wave of sectarian violence throughout India followed the
Babri mosque incident. 105 Amid this crisis, the President of India,
acting under an emergency provision of Article 356 of the
constitution, dismissed several BJP-led state governments. 106 These
dismissals were then challenged in the Supreme Court. In S. R.
Bommai v. Union of India,10 7 the court ruled that "secularism" was
part of the "basic structure" of the constitution, and that the
dismissals of the BJP-led state governments could be upheld if there
was reason to believe they were not acting in accordance with the
secularism inherent in the constitution. 108 The court's holding in
Bommai did not precisely define "secularism," and some of the
dismissals were upheld while others were not, but, ultimately,
according to S. P. Sathe, "the declaration that secularism was an
aspect of the basic structure of the constitution was a message to the
BJP that even a constitutional amendment seeking to tamper with
secularism would be vulnerable to being struck down by the
court."'109

Despite the public uproar and the legislature's reversal of the
court's decision in Shah Bano, the Supreme Court did not give up on
the issue of divorced Muslim women's rights. Although the court

103. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986,
Acts of Parliament 1986 (emphasis added).
104. JACOBSOHN, supra note 47, at 106.
105. Id. at 129.
106. SATHE, supranote 71, at 176.
107. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 A.I.R. S.C. 1918.
108. Id; see also SATHE, supra note 71, at 176.
109. SATHE, supra note 71, at 176.
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rejected some challenges to the 1986 Muslim Women's Act,110 the
court ultimately returned to the issue in the 2001 case of DanialLatifi
v. Union of India,"' in which the Muslim Women's Act was
challenged on various constitutional grounds, including the
violation of Article 14 (equality) and Article 15 (discrimination) of
the constitution, as well as violating the basic constitutional feature
of secularism." 2 The court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,
but did so through a broad, liberal construction of the Act's
requirement that the husband make a "reasonable and fair provision
and maintenance within the period of iddat." 113 The court
commented that if maintenance could only be authorized for three
months alone, that would appear to make the statute violate the
constitutional rights provisions on equality and discrimination, and,
so, applying the constitutional avoidance canon, the court construed
the statute to authorize maintenance orders for "reasonable and
fair" sums that may provide support for the divorced wife for much
longer than just the three-month period of iddat, so long as the
payment itself is made during the period of iddat. This ruling,
although contrary to the common understanding of the Act's
purpose, followed the actions of some lower courts at the state level,
which had already been interpreting the statute in this fashion and
awarding lump sum maintenance payments to divorced Muslim
women. 114
Thus, the Latifi ruling used creative statutory
interpretation to dodge constitutional controversy, while still
preserving judicial discretion in determining the size of
maintenance awards based on the facts of each case. This strategy
suggests that the court in the wake of Shah Bano has learned to
employ greater restraint and diplomacy in advancing their
interpretations of the law.
The Supreme Court has used other similar strategies in the

110. See Avadhesh v. Union of India, 1994 1 S.C.C. Supp. 713 (holding that a
petition "to declare Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 as
void being arbitrary and discriminatory and in violation of Articles 14 and 15
Fundamental Rights and Articles 44, 38, 39 and 39-A of the Constitution of India"
represented a matter for legislative, rather than judicial determination).
111. Latifi v. Union of India, 2001 A.I.R. 3958.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See The Shah Bano Legacy, THE HiNDu, Aug. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2003/08/10/stories/ 2003081000221500.htm.
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attempt to circumscribe the personal law in other cases. 115 In the
1999 case of Githa Hariharanv. Reserve Bank of India,116 section 6 of the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956 was challenged as
violating Articles 14 (equality) and 15 (discrimination) of the
constitution. Section 6 of the Act states that in the case of a Hindu
minor, guardianship should be assigned to "the father, and after
him, the mother ... ,"117 This statutory text had been understood to
mean "award custody to the mother if the father has died," but the
court observed that such a reading would make the act violate the
equality provision of the constitution. Therefore, applying the
constitutional avoidance canon and the understanding that the
legislative intent was to promote the welfare of the child, the court
construed the word "after" to mean an absence "temporary or
otherwise or total apathy of the father towards the child or even
inability of the father by reason of ailment or otherwise .... " 118 The
court declared that "[n]ormal rules of interpretation shall have to
bow down to the requirement of the Constitution since the
Constitution is supreme and the state shall have to be in accordance
therewith .... 119
In the 1996 case of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar,120 as in Danial
Latifi and Githa Hariharan, the court also negated a personal law
provision while avoiding directly striking down the law under the
constitution, but it did so through a slightly different technique of
statutory (re-)interpretation; it construed a tribal personal law
statute in light of certain "general principles" of law discerned from
the modernized (and thus more equitable) Hindu and Christian
codes of law. In this case, petitioners challenged certain provisions
of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 as violating Articles 14
(equality), 15 (discrimination) and 21 (right to life and personal
liberty). At issue were provisions of tribal customary law that
excluded women from inheriting property from male relatives.
The court held that general principles of inheritance law,

115. See discussion in Mihir Desai, Flip-flop on Personal Laws, COMBAT LAW 3(4)
(2004),
available at http://www.indiatogether.org/combatlaw/vol3/issue4/
flipflop.htm.
116. Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, 1999 A.I.R. 1149.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 1996 A.I.R. 1864.
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discerned from the modernized Hindu and Christian succession
laws, in effect, modified the unmodernized tribal code: "[Tihe
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 [which applies to Christians] though in terms,
would not apply to the Scheduled tribes, the general principles
contained therein being consistent with justice, equity, fairness,
justness would apply to them." 121 In its lengthy opinion, the court
quoted, in dicta, a scholarly work's conclusion that "secularization
of law is essential to the emergence of the modern Indian state" and
"the existence of different personal [laws] contradicts the principles
of non-discrimination by the State." 122
A final set of cases from the mid-1990s merits discussion here.
In these rulings, 123 known as the Hindutva cases, the Indian Supreme
Court considered whether appeals to Hindu identity violated the
Representation of the People Act 1951, an election law that prohibits
candidates from seeking votes on the basis of religion, or provoking
inter-religious enmity. 24 These cases raised the question of whether
campaign appeals to Hindutva by candidates from the BJP and other
Hindu nationalist parties were permissible. Hindutva, or
"Hinduness," is a vague term associated with a sense of Hindu
nationalist identity.
The Supreme Court concluded that appeals to Hindutva were
permissible. 2 5 The court held that Hindutva, and Hinduism, were
not narrow "religious" concepts, but reflected concepts of Hindu or
Indian culture and national development:
[N]o precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu',
'Hindutv', and 'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can
confine it to the narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the
content of Indian culture and heritage .... the term 'Hindutva' is
related more to the way of life of the people in the
subcontinent... the word Hindutva is used and understood as a
synonym of Indianisation, i.e., development of uniform culture by
obliterating the differences between all the cultures co-existing in

121. Id. Emphasis added.
122. Id. (quoting Donald Eugene Smith).
123. See, e.g, Prabhoo v. Kunte 1996 1 S.C.C. 130; Joshi v. Patil 1996 1 S.C.C. 169;
Kapse v Singh (1996) 1 S.C.C. 206.
124. See Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951, § 123(3); see also SATIRE,
supra note 71, at 182.
125. JACOBSOHN, supra note 47, at 193-94.
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the country. 126

Curiously, the court did not refer to its holding in Bommai that
secularism is part of the basic structure of the constitution, despite
the fact that this ruling was issued only a few years earlier and was
seemingly very relevant. By attempting to define Hindutva and
Hinduism, the court, as in Shah Bano, appeared to tread into the
treacherous territory of religious interpretation. Although the
court's decision in the Hindutva cases can perhaps be defended on
the basis of certain liberal principles, 127 many defenders of
secularism in India saw the Hindutva cases as a betrayal of
secularism, because the court seemed to bless the Hindu right's
assertions that an appeal to Hindutva is not an impermissible appeal
for votes based on religion.128 While the Hindutva cases are perhaps
not as far removed from the rest of the Indian Supreme Court's
secularism jurisprudence as some suggest, 129 they do signal at least
an apparent retreat from the court's staunch judicial defense of
"neutral" secularism in the Bommai case.
A likely explanation for this retreat is the impact of majoritarian
pressure due to the rise of the Hindu right in Indian politics.
Indeed, in 1996, the year the court decided the Prabhoo case, 130 the
most significant of the Hindutva cases, the BJP became the largest
political party in parliament, and briefly appointed a prime
minister. Although the court had upheld the dismissal of Hindu
nationalist state governments in Bommai in 1992, this time, rather
than waging a countermajoritarian struggle against the clear will of
the public by reversing the elections of winning candidates, the
court instead reached an accommodation with the rise in political
power of the Hindu right. It blessed Hindutva as a valid political
platform, but reinterpreted it as benignly as possible to mean
something like "Indian civilization."
Several conclusions emerge from this brief survey of the Indian
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the personal law and religious-

126. Prabhoo,supra note 123, at 159; see also id. at 200.
127. For example, freedom of expression or democratic majoritarianism. See id.
at 191-97.
128. JACOBSOHN, supra note 47, at 198.
129. See generally supra note 88 (arguing that Hindutya judgments fit into a
pattern of Supreme Court judgments which can be said to overlap with "the
ontology of Hindu nationalism").

130. Prabhoo,supra note 123.
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secular questions. First, as indicated in the court's lectures on
secularism and Article 44 of the Indian constitution, the court has a
preference for greater secularism in law, including the establishment
of a uniform civil code and the elimination of the personal law.
Second, the court's pleas for the state to fulfill Article 44 are
ineffectual and primarily have served to provoke controversy.
Third, in the aftermath of the uproar triggered by the Shah Bano
decision, however, the court appears to prefer rule in a somewhat
more economical and less inflammatory fashion, avoiding
unnecessary interpretive steps that are likely to provoke heightened
scrutiny and criticism of the court. It appears to do so by resorting
to creative legal interpretations, relying in particular on two
doctrinal tools: (1) A broad understanding of the constitutional
avoidance doctrine, which it invokes to sustain tenuous reinterpretations of the personal law in order to eliminate conflicts
with fundamental rights; and (2) the "general principles" doctrine,
which allows reinterpretation of religious laws in light of relevant
general principles "consistent with justice, equity, fairness, [and]
justness."
The court appears to have learned to exercise its
authority on religion-state matters with greater subtlety. Finally, as
illustrated by the Hindutva cases, the court's support for secularism
may not be immune to the major trends in majoritarian politics, and
it may have subtlely switched its support from a more neutral
version of secularism to the more Hindu-leaning version that gained
popularity in the political arena during the 1990s.
B. Israel
1. Background: Secularism and the IsraeliJudiciary
While both Israel and India have religious-based personal law
systems, these laws function differently under Israel's constitutional
structure. As noted above, in Israel, the religious laws are not
applied by the civil courts; instead, independent religious courts
apply religious law to members of their religious community.
Jewish rabbinical courts have exclusive jurisdiction over marriage
and divorce among Jews, while Muslim sharia courts have
jurisdiction over most personal status cases for Muslims. 1 31 There
131. The sharia law applied in Israel, like the sharia law applied in India, may
differ from classical sharia law in certain aspects, as its application has evolved in
the local context. Israeli sharia law, for example, has been impacted by the Ottoman
codification of Islamic law, its place within the state of Israel, and the lack of a body
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are no legal appeals from the decisions of the highest religious
courts, and thus these courts remain the final arbiters of their own
religious law.
Because the religious courts are considered
administrative agencies of the state, however, their rulings are
subject to review by the Israeli Supreme Court under the rubric of
judicial review of administrative action and compliance with
132
constitutional human rights norms embodied in the Basic Laws.
Conflicts between secular legal principles of gender equality and
tenets of religious law have created many controversies, as in India,
and the rabbinical requirements for marriage, which are deemed
onerous by many non-Orthodox Israeli Jews, are another common
flashpoint for conflict in Israel.
Questions involving the role of religion in society and Israel's
status as a Jewish state come before the Israeli Supreme Court with
relative frequency, and the court's jurisprudence can be described,
generally, as secularizing, in the sense that it has usually functioned
to reduce the influence of Jewish rabbinical law and scope of
rabbinical authority on the Israeli legal system as a whole. For
example, under the Israeli Law of Return, passed in 1950, Jews are
entitled to immigrate to Israel. In a series of cases over the decades
since 1950, the Supreme Court has determined eligibility for
immigration under that statute using definitions of who is a "Jew"
that differ from the definitions that obtain under traditional Jewish
law.1 33 The decisions in these cases, and others, have earned the
Supreme Court a reputation of hostility to religion in fervently
Orthodox circles in Israel. 1 34 The ultra-Orthodox community has
convened large public protests against the court, and issued calls for
of Islamic scholars, or ulema, officially empowered to engage in legal development.
See Moussa Abou Ramadan, The Shari'a in Israel: Islamization, Israelization, and the
Invented Islamic Law, 5 UCLA J.ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 81 (2005).
132. See Scolnicov, supra note 70, (citing HCJ 232/81 Vilozni v. Rabbinical Court
36 (2) PD 733) (review of administrative of action); see also HC 1000/92 Bavli v.
Great Rabbinical Court, 48(2) PD 221 (review based on constitutional norms)).
133. See, e.g., HC 72/62, Rufeisen v. Minister of Interior 16 PD 2428 (1962) (a
Catholic monk, although Jewish under Jewish law, may not immigrate under the
Law of Return); HC 58/68, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 (1969)
(individuals may be identified on government identity cards as Jews by nationality
with no religion); HC 230/86 Miller v. Minister of Interior 40(3) PD 436 (1986) (nonOrthodox converts to Judaism may qualify as Jews under the Law of Return).
134. See Ultra-orthodox Jews 'Target' Israeli Chief Justice, CNN, Sept. 20, 1996,
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/20/israel.justice/index.html
("Ultraconservative Jews... are now demanding that the Supreme Court be reshaped to
reflect Jewish religious law.").
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35

court reform.
Secular judicial power in Israel received a significant boost in
the mid-1990s following the enactment of two new Basic Laws in
1992. As described above, Israel does not have a constitution in the
form of a single, written document as in India and the United States,
but rather a series of basic laws that outline the basis of the political
order. The 1992 Basic Laws - Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and
Basic Law: Human Dignity - purport to provide Israel with a
formal, judicially enforceable Bill of Rights, although the Israeli
judiciary already enforced many human rights prior to 1992.136 The
laws also defined Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state." The
1992 Basic Laws have been interpreted to enable the Supreme Court
to exercise judicial review of Knesset legislation by striking down
37
laws that are incompatible with the rights under the Basic Laws.
This development has been termed a "constitutional revolution" in
Israel.138
In an early case that illustrates how judicial review functions in
Israel, a private company, Meatrael, that sought to import nonkosher meat appealed to the Supreme Court against the
government's refusal to allow the importation.139 The company
claimed a violation of its rights to freely pursue an economic
initiative under the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, while the
government argued that Israel's status as a Jewish state, enshrined
in the Basic Laws, permitted it to forbid the importation.140 The
court ruled in favor of Meatrael.' 4 ' The Knesset, responding to
pressure from religious parties, thereafter amended the Basic Laws
to allow modification by the Knesset, and then modified the law
In a
specifically to forbid non-kosher meat importation. 142

135. See Deborah Sontag, 250,000 Israeli Orthodox Hold Protest Rally, Peaceably,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1999.
136. See generally GARY JEFFREY JACOBsOHN, APPLE OF GOLD (Princeton University
Press 1993).
137. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village [19951
IsrSC 49(4) 221.
138. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The ConstitutionalRevolution: Protected Human Rights,
1 LAW & GOV'T IN ISRAEL 9 (1992).
139. HCJ 3872/93 Meatrael Ltd. v. Prime Minister & Minister of Religious Affairs
[1993] IsrSC 47(5) 485.
140. Hirschl, supra note 11, at 1837.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1838.
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subsequent case, the Supreme Court ruled against Meatrael, citing
143
the new meat law.
This episode demonstrates the Israeli judiciary's role as a key
player in resolving the religious-secular controversies that
frequently arise in Israeli society. Although the Israeli court lacks
the powers of the high courts in the United States and India, where
the courts, rather than the legislature, can have the "final say" on
certain constitutional matters, there are often high political costs for
the legislature to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court,
especially when controversial claims about rights are at issue, and
so the Israeli court still has significant power to influence many
questions of public policy. Yet this episode also illustrates the limits
and the fragility of the court's power to make decisions in this realm,
because its decision was not only reversed by the Knesset, but
provoked the Knesset to reduce the court's overall legal power.
2. The Israeli Supreme Court's Personal Law Jurisprudence
The Israeli Supreme Court's rulings, like those of the Indian
court, display a clear tendency to take the side of secularism in
religious-secular conflicts. In the arena of the personal law, the
court's rulings operate to homogenize and regularize the operations
of the religious courts, and to extend secular, civil rights and
However, the so-called
principles into the religious courts.
"constitutional revolution" in Israel would not, at first blush, appear
to affect questions of the personal law and the power of religious
courts deeply. Because the power of judicial review of legislation
under the 1992 Basic Laws does not allow the court to strike down
laws or parts of laws that were previously enacted, the Supreme
Court cannot directly invalidate or circumscribe any of the
legislation setting up the religious courts - because all of this
legislation predates 1992.144 Indeed, for example, the legislation
authorizing the Christian religious courts in Israel remains the
British Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922, which is still in effect
where it has not been superseded. 145 Rather than invalidating
legislation, however, the court, much like its Indian counterpart,
generally uses other tools and norms of legal interpretation to
accomplish the same result.
143. Id.
144. See Scolnicov, supra note 70.
145. See SHETREET, supranote 53, at 106.
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Two gender equality cases illustrate how the human rights
norms embodied in the Basic Laws can be applied to limit
inequalities in Jewish law, and the challenges of such an approach.
In the first case, Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court from 1994, the
Supreme Court instructed the rabbinical courts to apply the
principle of equal division of marital property - which does not
accord with halakha.146 The basis for the decision rested on the
court's interpretation of a civil law - the Women's Equal Rights Law
1951 - as applying in religious courts as well as civil courts. The
court's decision went on to add that religious courts must follow
general principles and norms of constitutional law, as defined in the
Basic Laws, thus expanding the court's power of judicial review
over the religious courts. 147 This judicial approach - that religious
law must be applied in harmony with transcendent general
principles of secular law - is similar to the one taken by the Indian
court in Madhu Kishwar.
Not surprisingly, the rabbinical courts have opposed the Bavli
ruling, in some cases refusing to follow it, on the grounds that they
are bound to apply halakha.148 The issue of equitable division of
marital property arose again in the similar 2003 case of Yemini v.
Great Rabbinical Court, in which the Supreme Court again ruled that
religious courts must apply an equitable distribution.149 In Yemini,
the decision turned on the court's interpretation of another civil
statute, the Spouses (Property Relations) Law 1973, which is to
apply in all courts unless the parties have agreed that religious law
should apply. 150 The Rabbinical Court argued that by submitting a
case to the jurisdiction of the religious court, when concurrent
jurisdiction also existed with civil courts, the parties had agreed to
be bound by Jewish law and not the Property Relations Law.' 5 ' The
Supreme Court, however, interpreted the statute to require the
explicit consent of both parties to be bound by religious law rather
than the Property Relations law, regardless of the forum of

146. HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 221.
147. See Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A Comparative
Assessment of the Impact of Bills of Rights in Canada and Israel, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 293

(2005).
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Scolnicov, supra note 70, at 732-33.
HCJ 9734/03 Yemini v. Great Rabbinical Court [20031.
See Scolnicov, supra note 70, at 733.
Id.
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litigation. 5 2
Thus, Bavli and Yemini illustrate how the Supreme Court
constrains the authority of the religious courts by employing
statutory interpretation and by requiring them to comply with
general constitutional and legal principles derived from Basic Laws
and other statutes. Yet these cases also illustrate the difficulty of the
secular courts in successfully achieving religious law reform; the
rabbinical courts may disregard the principles underlying the
Supreme Court's controversial rulings because they regard halakha
as the source of legal authority, while the Supreme Court lacks
53
authority to actually rule on matters of halakha.1
4
The cases of Katz v. Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court (2000)15
and Amir v. Great Rabbinal Court (2003)155 illustrate another mode by
which the Supreme Court attempts to rein in the religious courts: by
enforcing (or circumscribing) the borders of their jurisdictional
authority. In Katz, the Supreme Court ruled that rabbinical courts
lacked the authority to ostracize an individual who refused to have
a civil matter adjudicated by the rabbinical court. 156 According to
the decision, the rabbinical courts, as legally constituted organs of
the Israeli government, could only exercise those powers explicitly
vested in them by law. 157 In Amir, the Supreme Court applied the
same ultra vires logic in the arena of arbitration. In that case, both
parties had consented to an arbitration in the rabbinical courts over
a dispute stemming from a divorce agreement that originated in the
rabbinical court, but the Supreme Court held that the religious
courts, as state organs, have not been granted the legal authority to
158
act as arbitrators.
A recent religious controversy involving the Chief Rabbinate of
Israel and the sale of agricultural produce also illustrates many of
the techniques used by the Israeli Supreme Court in reviewing the
action of religious authorities. Although the Chief Rabbinate is a

152. Id.
153. See id.
154. HC 3269/95, Katz v. Jerusalem Reg'l Rabbinical Court [2000] IsrSC 50(4)
590.
155. HCJ 8636/03 Amir v. Great Rabbinical Court [2003].
156. See Hirschl, supra note 11, at 1841.
157. Id.
158. This ruling would not apply to religious courts that are not organs of the
state. See Scolnicov, supra note 70, at 735 n.14.
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separate state institution from the religious courts, both are
considered administrative bodies subject to the same type of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
The recent controversy arose due to a change in the Chief
Rabbinate's regulations for produce grown during the Jewish
sabbatical, or shmita, year. According to Jewish law, every seventh
year shall be a sabbatical year in which debts shall be forgiven,
farmland shall be left fallow, and any produce that grows naturally
on the land is considered public property so that the poor can take
it.159 Produce that is farmed by Jews during the sabbatical year is,
therefore, not considered kosher, making it difficult to market in
Israel, where many institutions have kosher food requirements.
However, since halting all agricultural production for an entire year
is a difficult proposition in a modem economy, rabbinical
authorities developed a legal artifice, known as a sales permit, or
heter mechira, to cope with this challenge.
Under this halakhic loophole, introduced over 120 years ago,
land owned by Jews is nominally "sold" to non-Jews just for the
period of the sabbatical year. Since the restrictions of the sabbatical
year do not apply to non-Jews, the sales permit allows farming to
continue uninterrupted. Since before Israel's founding, the Chief
Rabbinate has certified produce grown under the sales permit
arrangement as kosher. However, for the Jewish sabbatical year
that began in October 2007, the Chief Rabbinate, under pressure
from ultra-Orthodox factions who wanted challenge the validity of
the sales permit concept, decided to reverse its longstanding policy
of giving kosher certification to farmers using the permit. Instead,
the Rabbinate deferred the question of kosher certification to
municipal rabbis. Some of these local rabbis certified the produce
and some did not, thereby creating substantial confusion, hardships
160
for the farming industry, and an increase in the price of food.
The issue promptly came before the Supreme Court. In Produce
Production and Marketing Board v. Chief Rabbinate of Israel,161 the
Supreme Court ruled against the Rabbinate, ordering it to return to

159. See Exodus 23:10-11; Leviticus 25:1-7.
160. See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Court Checks Chief Rabbinate on Special-Year Food,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2007/10/24/africa/mideast.php.
161. HC 7120/07 Produce Production and Marketing Board v. Chief Rabbinate
of Israel [2007].
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its traditional, centralized policy and issue kosher certifications for
produce grown under the sales permit. The court's ruling illustrates
many of the methods it typically employs in overseeing religious
authorities, including religious courts. The court noted that while it
gives deference to the Rabbinate and does not itself interpret halakha,
the Rabbinate, as a state administrative body, must adhere to norms
of administrative law, including reasonability, proportionality, and
procedural adequacy in decision-making.162
Applying these "general principles" of administrative law, the
court held that the administrative process used by the Rabbinate in
its decision to change its policy was inadequate because it relied on
a telephone poll, did not engage in sufficient data analysis and
deliberation, and failed to give sufficient advance notice of its new
policy. 163
The court also held that the policy change was
unreasonable in its failure to balance the interests of farmers and the
general public against the interests supporting the policy change. 164
The concurring opinion of the President of the Court, Justice Dorit
Beinisch, also found a disproportionate infringement of certain
rights articulated in the Basic Laws, including the rights of farmers
to property and freedom to pursue their occupation.1 65 Justice
Beinisch also held that rights of equality and non-discrimination
were violated by the Rabbinate's policy because of the serious harm
to farmers and to the poor, due to the increase in produce prices
(because only imported produce would be available). 166
Although the specific procedural defects that the court pointed
to in this case might not often arise in the religious court context, the
court's approach - applying general norms of administrative law
and constitutional law - is typical of its review of religious courts.
These norms - like the rule that an infringement of a basic right
must be "proportionate" or that a decision must reflect a
"reasonable" weighing of interests - are open to substantial judicial
interpretation, thereby allowing the Supreme Court significant
discretion to review decisions of the religious authorities.
The court generally uses this discretion to ease the burden of
religious coercion perceived by many in Israel's secular majority.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. 25 (opinion of Justice Rubinstein).
Id.
25-27.
Id. 28.
Id. 3b (opinion of Justice Beinisch).
Id.
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Nevertheless, the religious population is growing proportionally
larger, is politically influential in the Knesset, and has mobilized
vast public protests against the Supreme Court due to
"antireligious" rulings in the past, particularly at times when the
Israeli-Arab tensions are at a low ebb. 1 67 Therefore, the court
attempts to be as accommodating as possible with religious interests
- for example, in the sales permit case, the Justices' opinions are at
pains to cite the "many great rabbis" who supported the sales
permit - while ruling in favor of secular interests in the end.
By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court's approach to the Muslim
sharia courts reflects a more laissez faire attitude, unlike in India
where debates over reforming the personal law of the sizeable
Muslim minority are the major point of contention. As noted above,
the sharia courts have the widest jurisdiction of all religious courts in
Israel, with exclusive jurisdiction over most matters of personal
status for Muslims. This broad jurisdiction gives the sharia courts a
significant role in the Muslim community. 168 As there are no official
ulama or muftis (traditional scholarly interpreters of Islamic law) in
Israel, sharia in Israel has developed case by case through the
decisions of the qadis, the Islamic court judges.169
Civil laws, like the Women's Equal Rights Law and the
Succession Law, theoretically apply to the Israeli Muslim
community, but, according to Martin Edelman, the innovations
contained in these laws are often ignored in the sharia courts in
practice and not vigorously enforced by the government, which
tends to have little interest in Muslim social practices. 170
The state has pushed through some reforms; it has been
particularly insistent on banning polygamy, which is illegal under
Israeli law but is permitted by sharia and was also practiced by some
Jews who came to Israel from Arab countries. Today, polygamy is
mostly confined to Bedouin communities in the Negev region. Other
areas of reform have met with more mixed success. Edelman
explains that a 1959 amendment to the Women's Equal Rights Law
created a penalty of five years imprisonment for divorcing a wife

167. See Sontag, supra note 135.
168. EDELMAN, supra note 54, at 79.
169. Id. at 77; see Abou Ramadan, supra note 131, regarding the ways sharia as
applied in Israel is unique from other applications of Islamic law.
170. See EDELMAN, supra note 54, at 80-88.
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against her will. 171 The purpose of this statute was to deter the
Muslim practice of talaq divorce, the same practice that had initiated
the controversy that proved so offensive to the Indian court in Shah
Bano. According to Edelman, there is some opposition to talaq
divorce among Israeli qadis, and therefore some qadis will warn the
husband about the criminal penalty before registering the divorce or
will urge the wife to file a criminal complaint; other qadis simply
register the divorce, though. 172 In other areas, reforms made
available under the civil law have had little practical effect on the
Muslim community. For example, although the Succession Law
provides for concurrent civil court jurisdiction for succession cases
and establishes a consent requirement for sharia courts to hear the
cases, these cases are routinely brought to the sharia courts, even
though certain parties might benefit from a hearing in the civil
courts. In addition, the qadis do not always insist on obtaining the
required consent. 173
Thus, in contrast to the rabbinical courts, there are fewer cases
in which the Supreme Court attempts to rein in or secularize the
sharia courts. The Supreme Court's review of the sharia courts tends
to be more deferent.1 74 There are many possible reasons for this
trend, including that (1) there appear to be few elements in the
Israeli Muslim community agitating for greater secularization of the
personal law; (2) the Jewish majority sees little to gain by provoking
conflicts with Muslim community over religious law, both
domestically and vis-A-vis the wider Muslim and Arab world; (3)
the concept of community-based religious autonomy has popular
support in Israel society, even if many Jews would prefer the
content of the personal laws governing them to be updated. 75
This survey of the Israeli Supreme Court's religious and
personal law jurisprudence suggests several trends. First, the court
is very active in adjudicating religious-secular controversies
involving Jewish religious courts, generally ruling to minimize the
171. Id. at 83.
172. Id. at 83-84.
173. Id. at 86.
174. See Ramadan, supra note 131, at 102 (commenting on HCJ 9347/99 Ali
Hamza v. The Shari'a Court of Appeals in Jerusalem and Others PD 55(2): "The
High Court does not feel at ease in its role as a 'high interpreter' for a shari'a
decision. Therefore, it supports its position by referring to the Shari'a Court of
Appeals.").
175. See EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 88.
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jurisdictional authority of these religious courts by prioritizing (1)
procedural norms of secular law; and (2) the civil and human rights
of the individual over claims of religious autonomy or any concept
of Israel as a Jewish state in the religious sense.17 6 Second, the
court's reliance on "general principles" of administrative and
constitutional law - including reasonableness and proportionality
tests - give it substantial discretionary authority to review religious
decisions. Third, specific rulings of the court on religion-secular
matters have provoked challenges to its authority from the Knesset,
the religious courts, and religious segments of the public, but this
resistance appears to affect the court's rulings primarily at the level
of rhetoric rather than outcome.
III. Comparative Analysis and Discussion
This paper has shown how major questions about the
relationship between religion and state are being answered by the
high courts of India and Israel. It will now turn to a discussion of
why these foundational political questions have been transferred to
the judiciary, the limits of the judiciary's role in answering them,
and what this means for other polities that may be considering
introducing religious pluralism into their constitutional order.
A. Explanationsfor JudicialEmpowerment
This section will address possible theories about why political
questions about religion and secularism are being transferred to the
judiciary, how the timing of the transfer of power to the judiciary
may illuminate the political reasons for this transfer, and whether
normative conclusions should be drawn from the political origins of
judicial empowerment.
One possible explanation for the transfer of decision-making
power over fractious religious questions to courts is that in deeply
fractured societies - i.e., societies with deep ethnic or religious rifts,
like Israel and India - leaving certain questions for judicial
resolution provides the necessary stability for democratic
governance to take hold and function on other fronts.177 Samuel
Issacharoff writes that "constitutionalism emerges as a central

177. See Samuel Issacharoff, Symposium, ConstitutionalCourts in the Field of Powers
Politics: Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1861
(2004).

2009]

Divine Judgment

defining power in these [fractured] societies precisely because of the
While this
limitations it imposes on democratic choice." 78
explanation may provide a strong rebuttal to the criticism that
judicial decision-making is inherently un-democratic, it remains
unclear, as a practical matter, how successful judicial review can
ultimately be at permanently mediating the tensions that exist along
these social rifts, even if a perceived ability of judicial review to
bridge these rifts can explain the judicialization of politics.
A counterpoint comes from Ruth Gavison, who argues that "in
rifted democracies, courts should be reluctant to determine specific
arrangements and priorities, especially in areas of social
controversy, where the grounds of judicial action are not clear,"
because such judicial determinations may undermine social
cohesion.1 79 The long saga of Shah Bano and its aftermath in India,
and the power struggle waged between the Supreme Court and the
religious courts in Israel support Gavison's view, but Issacharoff's
thesis may represent a valid justification for judicial review in the
1 80
short-term in post-conflict settings.
A more detailed and fact-specific explanation of judicial
empowerment in Israel comes from Ran Hirschl, who gives a
persuasive explanation of why Israel expanded the judiciary's
power via the Basic Laws in 1992. According to Hirschl's thesis,
dominant political elites, fearing populist erosion of their
dominance in majoritarian arenas like the Knesset, cooperated with
legal elites to move certain questions outside the realm of ordinary
politics. 81 In general, these elites were secular in their orientation,
while the more populist forces they feared were associated with
more religious sectors of society. Hirschl explains:
[As] the secular bourgeoisie in Israel has faced a continuous
decline in its political hegemony and representation since the
early 1980s, marginalized groups, such as residents of peripheral
development towns and poor urban neighborhoods (mainly
Mizrahi Jews and immigrants from the former Soviet Union),
Israeli-Arabs from ethnically mixed towns, and lower income
178. Id.
179. Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 218
(1999).
180. The states upon which Issacharoff's thesis is based are Bosnia and postapartheid South Africa.
181. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
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religious groups, have continuously gained political power
during this period ...Well aware of the backlash eroding its
hegemony, representatives of the Ashkenazi secular bourgeoisie
in the Knesset initiated and promoted Israel's 1992 constitutional
revolution in cooperation with economic and legal elites. In this
revolution, hegemonic elites and their political representatives
transferred the main locus of political struggle from parliament,
local government, and other majoritarian decisionmaking arenas
to the Supreme Court, where their ideological hegemony faces
82
less of a challenge.
A version of this "hegemonic preservation" thesis can perhaps
also explain the expansion of judicial power in India that occurred
during the late 1960s through the mid-1970s. No additional
constitutionalization of rights occurred at that time, since the Indian
Supreme Court has always had the power of judicial review, but
that is the time when the Indian Supreme Court began introducing
the doctrines, discussed above, that expanded their powers of
judicial review to include constitutional amendments.
The
dominance of the Congress Party over Indian politics had been
secure from independence until 1967, when opposition parties won
several state elections. At this time, the Congress Party split into a
more conservative faction, tied to established local elites, and a
radical faction under Indira Gandhi, which advanced populist,
redistributive policies, such as bank nationalization.18 3 1967 is the
same year the Indian Supreme Court produced the Golaknath
decision, a decision defending property rights, which first
established the Supreme Court's power to review constitutional
amendments. Thus, the Supreme Court's expansion of its own
power at the expense of the legislature can be seen as a defense of
elite interests threatened by populist trends. It is important to note,
however, that locating the origin of judicial empowerment in India
and Israel in the political attempt of dominant elites to
institutionalize their value preferences in light of perceived threats
to their hegemony in majoritarian politics is a descriptive account,
and does not necessarily embody a normative judgment about the
legitimacy of this judicialization. 184
182. Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment
Through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J INT'L L. 73

(2000).
183. SATHE, supra note 71, at 68.
184. All constitutions and laws are political documents and reflect the interests
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In both countries, the attempt to shift religious questions into
the hands of secular-oriented courts may signal an increase in the
perceived need of these dominant, and now declining, secular elites
to cooperate with specific religious constituencies in order to extend
their dominance farther into the future. Because these secular forces
increasingly expect to need the support of religious forces to govern,
it suits the secularists' interests to have questions of religion
removed from ordinary politics as much as possible, in order to
hinder their religious allies from pursuing significant changes in the
secular-religious framework that would go against their own
political preferences.
Under Israel's coalition government system, the larger, secular
political parties often cannot attain the necessary parliamentary
majority to form a government without allying with smaller
religious parties. Religious parties often demand support for
policies that reflect their religious interests in exchange for their
supporting the governing coalition. Indeed, this dynamic was a key
part of the rationale that resulted in the original religious status quo
compromise in Israel. In the current Knesset at the time of writing,
the governing coalition is led by Kadima, a secular, centrist party,
but also includes Shas, a party representing Orthodox Jews of
Middle Eastern descent, and Labor-Meimad, itself an alliance
85
between the secular Labor Party and a left-leaning religious party.'
Without the support of Shas, the government would fall; in such a
situation, Shas becomes much more powerful than its simple
number of parliamentary seats would indicate. Since this scenario is
typical of Israeli politics and since the demographic base of religious
parties is growing, it serves the interests of the secular parties to
have court-enforced limits on secular-religious issues, so that, in
effect, their hands are tied when religious parties seek concessions.
In India, the country's Muslim minority, considered the
primary stakeholders in the religious personal law system, numbers
and compromises of the political context that created them. That the timing of
judicial empowerment occurs not at the time of a revolution, but rather at a time
when the post-revolutionary establishment feels that their achievements will be
threatened by changing trends in society, does not necessarily make the
institutionalization of their value preferences any more or less legitimate. Rather,
the legitimacy of this development should be based on an evaluation of the
legitimacy of the procedures and substantive values implicated.
185. In the first half of 2008. The coalition also includes a party representing
pensioners. Yisrael Beitenu, a party representing immigrants from the former
Soviet Union, was in the coalition for a time.
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over 150 million people, representing significant electoral power.
The Hindu right-wing, exemplified by the Bharatiya Janata Party
("BJP"), frequently accuses the Congress Party of pandering to
Muslim interests in order to get votes.' 86 The strength of the BJP has
grown significantly over the past two decades, and it has led the
Indian government and become the major force of opposition to the
Congress Party. The BJP has campaigned on the issue of replacing
the personal law system, which it sees as an illegitimate concession
to the Muslim community, with the uniform civil code. 187 Therefore,
it may reflect the interest of Congress Party elites to judicialize
religious questions and remove them from ordinary politics,
because the less religion is an issue at stake in the political process,
the more the Congress Party can immunize itself from the charge
that it favors Muslims without having to actually entertain any
policies that might anger its Muslim voter base.
Thus, the political dynamics of dominant political forces'
attempts to preserve their own power can likely explain the increase
in judicialized politics. The more important question, from the
perspective of this paper, however, relates to how effectively civil
courts can actually protect these value preferences they prioritize.
In other words, can the high courts of Israel and India truly
safeguard principles of secularism in the face of surging popular
support for more religious policies?

B. Evaluatingthe Effectiveness of JudicialManagement of
Religious Law
The record of adjudication on questions of religious law in the
supreme courts of Israel and India indicates only a limited ability of
those courts to safeguard or advance principles of secularism
through judicial review. Of course, this conclusion is only tentative,
as these issues are continuing to be resolved by courts, and the longterm effects of judicial politics may be difficult to evaluate.
186. See Manmohan Acting Like Aurangzeb, says BJP, EXPRESSINDIA, Mar. 12, 2008,
available at http:/ /www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Manmohan-acting-likeAurangzeb-says-BJP/283567/2/ (accusing the government of "vote-bank politics,"
the BJP "compared Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with Mughal ruler Aurangzeb
claiming the former had said Muslims had the first right over the state's
resources.").
187. See Does India Really Need a Uniform Civil Code?, THE TIMEs OF INDIA, Aug. 2,
2003, availableat http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/103103.cms.
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Nevertheless, if we assume that certain responses to a judicial
decision are indicative of an erosion in judicial power - outbreaks of
violence, disregard for the decision, protests, and legislative
responses to reverse the decision or limit the power of the court then it seems that all of these outcomes, either directly or indirectly,
can be tied to judicial decision-making on religion questions in India
and Israel. Only non-violent protests and legislative responses
indicate a healthy democracy is functioning, although if one's
definition of democracy includes substantive guarantees of human
rights, like gender equality or lack of religious coercion, or if one
prioritizes those substantive values above the value of majoritarian
democracy, then even these responses will be unsatisfactory. The
experiences of India and Israel suggest that civil courts in a religious
legal pluralist polity may not be able to protect secularism and civil
rights from religious forces in majoritarian politics. This conclusion
has significant implications for debates about the power of courts to
effect social change, the "countermajoritarian difficulty" allegedly
posed when courts make political decisions, as well as for proposals
to introduce pluralism into other democracies.
The Shah Bano decision of the Indian Supreme Court and its
aftermath provide a useful illustration of how apex courts can fail in
their attempts to secure citizens' secular legal rights against claims
made by traditional sources of cultural and religious authority. As
described above, the decision not only provoked a popular Muslim
backlash that led to the passage of a law reversing the court's ruling,
but this, in turn, provoked a counter-backlash that strengthened
anti-Muslim extremism and, according to some, led to acts of
terrorism and civil strife.
Thus, the court's decision had the effect of diminishing the
court's authority, by the reversal of its decision, and provoked
religious tension in society, but did little to advance the secularist
goals described in the opinion. The strident tone of the Shah Bano
opinion itself, and its lack of judicial economy, indicated by its
unnecessary foray into Quranic interpretation, may have had a lot to
do with the furor it provoked. The court's more recent decision in
Latifi, which reaches the same functional result as Shah Bano in a
more restrained fashion, did not provoke the same controversy.
Thus, for now it seems, the court has ultimately achieved the
outcome it wanted on the issue of support payments for divorced
Muslim women. But 17 years passed between these two decisions,
and major chapters in Indian politics, such as the rise of the Hindu
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right and a resurgence of sectarian violence, both of which may have
been affected by the Shah Bano affair, took place in the interim.
Despite the opinions in which the Indian Supreme Court has
advocated for a uniform civil code and reminded the government
that the constitution advises that one be implemented, there has
been no legislative movement in that direction. Furthermore, the
Indian Supreme Court appears to have softened its own
interpretation of secularism and sided more with public opinion in
the Hindutva judgments, which were issued at a time when the
Hindu right proponents of Hindutva were gaining significant
political power. Thus, while the Indian Supreme Court has, on the
whole, generally ruled in favor of secular outcomes, it has made
only a few practical advances in restraining or reforming the
personal law; these advances have been hard fought over the course
of many years; its jurisprudence on these questions is defensive in
that it tends to use canons of construction to avoid raising any overt
constitutional conflicts, even where these conflicts might seem
readily apparent; and it is not immune from the prevalent forces of
public opinion.
The Israeli Supreme Court appears to have had slightly more
success than the Indian Court in legally restraining religious
authority, but practically it has also provoked more frequent
challenges to its authority. In Amir v. Great Rabbinal Court, the
Supreme Court enforced the limits on the rabbinical courts
jurisdictional authority, and in the sabbatical year case, the court
effected a reversal of the Chief Rabbinate's policy. Yet even though
both of these examples appear to impose legal limitations on
religious authority, they can also be seen as defensive rulings in
which the Supreme Court merely prevented an unauthorized
expansion of rabbinical court power into a new arena (as in Amir),
and protected the status quo with respect to a 120-year-old kosher
policy that was under attack from extremely Orthodox factions.
The Meatrael case in Israel is similar to the Shah Bano affair in
India in that it provides an example of how a backlash to a judicial
ruling on a religious question can lead to a decrease in the court's
power and a reversal of its decision. In that case, as described
above, the Knesset reduced the court's power of judicial review by
revising the Basic Law to allow for a parliamentary override, and
then overrode the court's specific decision with a new law
prohibiting non-kosher meat importation.
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The reaction to the Israeli court's Bavli decision on marital
property provides an illustration of a different sort of authority
backlash problem than the one in Meatrael : Some religious courts
simply refused to follow the Supreme Court's legal ruling. This
disregard for the general, secular law is also a problem in the Israeli
sharia courts, where secular principles of equality are sometimes
ignored. This authority gap undermines the integrity of the Israeli
legal system, but the Supreme Court, lacking powers of enforcement
or implementation, can do little but continue to protest and issue
rulings in accordance with its jurisprudence. The state government
would have to intervene to actually force the religious courts to
comply - for example, by replacing judges - but if the government
does not do so, the Supreme Court's options are limited.
These cases indicate that when ruling on questions of religious
law, the secular supreme courts face a deficit of what Richard Fallon
terms "sociological legitimacy": the support of the public for their
rulings.188 Fallon describes three types of sociological legitimacy:
institutional legitimacy (whether the public believes in general that
the court is a trustworthy decision-maker); the substantive
legitimacy of rulings (whether the public believes a particular ruling
is substantively correct); and authoritative legitimacy (whether the
public believes judicial decisions should be obeyed).189 Of course,
different elements of the public may hold different views, and
overall legitimacy may depend on differing levels of support from
different categories of citizens; Fallon cites H.L.A. Hart for the
proposition that government officials and lawyers must "embrace
shared legal norms.., as providing reasons for action" while
ordinary citizens usually need only to acquiesce in those norms. 190
The reactions to the prominent religion-state cases above
illustrate significant legitimacy challenges to secular courts ruling
on religion-state questions. The primary source of these legitimacy
challenges comes from the religious public - Muslims in India,
Orthodox Jews in Israel - who believe the ultimate authority of
religious law is divine in origin, and therefore, that judicial review

188. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1787
(2005).
189. Id. This last type is different from substantive legitimacy because in some
cases people believe a ruling, although substantively incorrect, should nevertheless
be followed.
190. Id. at 1828.
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based on the supremacy of secular laws has got it backwards. 191
Because the religious interests of this segment of the public are wellrepresented (perhaps disproportionately represented) in the Israeli
and Indian legislatures, and in relevant public institutions, a low
enough view of the institutional legitimacy of the court or in the
substantive or authoritative legitimacy of its rulings may be
translated into a legislative reversal or reduction of the court's
power.
It appears that these legitimacy challenges run deeper in Israel
than in India. 192 Although the Shah Bano decision clearly had a
substantive legitimacy problem, in Israel, the authoritative
legitimacy of court decisions is undermined by the noncompliance
of religious courts, and there are proposals to alter the framework in
which the judiciary operates. Under a draft version of a formal
Israeli constitution that has been prepared by the Knessset's
Constitution, Law, and Justice committee, the Supreme Court would
lose the power of judicial review over religious matters; 193 another
constitutional proposal from the Israel Democracy Institute, a
prominent think tank, would also take away this power from the
94

court.1

Another, more substantial challenge to the overall institutional
legitimacy of the Israeli Supreme Court has been mounted recently
by the Minister of Justice at the time of writing. Israeli Justice
Minister Daniel Friedmann, previously a well-known law professor,
has proposed reforms restricting the Supreme Court's power by
giving the Knesset more control over the selection of justices and
removing the court's power to hear certain cases.1 95 This challenge
has resulted in a bitter public debate between Friedmann and
supporters of the Supreme Court, including court President Dorit
Beinisch and former court President Aharon Barak, who believes the

191. See Scolnicov, supranote 70.
192. Criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court as overly activist does not just focus
on religious matters. National security issues also figure prominently in critiques of
the court.
193. See Yuval Yoaz, Friedmann opposes constitution that compromises on religious
matters, HAARETZ, Oct. 23, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/916114.html.
194. Id.
195. See Ari Shavit, Ex-chief justice: Friedmann reforms will make Israel third world
country, HAARETZ, Apr. 4, 2008, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/
hasen/spages/972817.html.

2009]

Divine Judgment

proposed reforms will castrate the court and eliminate the rule of
law in Israel. 196 Curiously, Friedmann actually seems to support the
court's activism on religious questions, while opposing it in all other
areas. 197 This position is curious because, by subjecting the court to
greater Knesset control, the reforms would almost certainly lead to
greater influence of religious parties on the court. So far, the reforms
have not passed in the Knesset.
The institutional legitimacy of the court to engage in judicial
review may be less firmly established in Israel because the practice
of judicial review has a shorter history there. In addition, judicial
review over religion-state questions in Israel may have less
institutional legitimacy because of the centrality of the religioussecular rift inside the Jewish majority population (compared to India
where the religion-state controversies generally pit Muslims against
Hindus) .198
In sum, in neither Israel nor India has the high court effected a
fundamental change in the status of the religious personal laws or
the basic components for religion-state accommodation, despite the
courts' secular-oriented jurisprudence. The Israeli court appears to
have been a bit more activist in its defense of secularism than the
Indian court, which at times may have has modified its vision of
secularism to reflect trends in line with majoritarian politics, but in
so doing, the Israeli court may have provoked greater challenges to
its authority.
IV. Conclusion
This conclusion suggests civil courts in democratic states have
only a limited ability to advance (or defend) principles of secularism
against entrenched religious authorities backed by politically
influential segments of society. The fact that courts in a democracy
lack strong implementation powers and must fear the reversal of
their decisions or the erosion of their powers by the legislature

196. Id.
197. See supra note 192 ("Friedmann's position is that the only issue that makes a
constitution necessary, that justifies High Court's intervention, and in which its
activism is beneficial, is the religious issue.").
198. See supra note 48 (explaining that the personal law in India is primarily a site
of inter - rather than intra - communal conflict). However, Galanter and Krishnan
may have overstated this point a bit, because the personal law is also a significant
site of intra- Hindu debate over the meaning of secularism.
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means that their resources for opposing public opinion, as reflected
in the legislature, are limited.
The countermajoritarian difficulty 99 refers to the argument that
court decisions lack democratic legitimacy when unelected judges
overturn the decisions of popularly elected legislatures. Expanding
the power of the judiciary to make political decisions, such as
decisions about religion and state, theoretically compounds this
difficulty. 200 Without delving into the extensive theoretical literature
and debates on this question, 201 I suggest that the experience of the
Indian and Israeli Supreme Courts in adjudicating contentious
religion-state matters, and the resistance that their rulings have
encountered, suggests that, as an empirical matter, concerns about
the countermajoritarian difficulty may not be particularly relevant
in this context; the checks of majoritarian politics will likely restrain
the court into modifying its jurisprudence, or rein it in by reducing
its powers or directly reversing its decisions. This conclusion is in
line with studies finding that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions
generally reflect public opinion with a five-year lag time, 202 and
support the argument advanced by Gerald Rosenberg that court
decisions are powerless to produce social change without the
additional support of public opinion and other institutions of
203
government.
What does this mean for states that may be considering
introducing some form of religious legal pluralism, like the sharia
arbitration tribunals proposed in Canada? First, that judicial review
by civil courts may be an ineffective means of ensuring that the
199. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
200. Of course, the legislatures are only an imperfect reflection of public opinion,
and often are not truly majoritarian, especially with respect to individual issues.
For example, it is possible - and indeed likely - that if a national referendum were
held on the personal laws in Israel and India, those systems would at least be
reformed, if not abolished, but the dynamics of the legislative system enhance the
strategic power of the constituencies that support religious law.
201. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 199; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:
Comparative Illumination of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245
(1995).
202. William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
CountermajoritarianInstitution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390 (1993).
203. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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religious legal system respects established civil rights. Dismissing
objections to the proposed plan for introducing sharia tribunals in
Ontario, Dahlia Lithwick writes:
Truth be told, it's pretty hard to tease out a meaningful objection
to sharia panels under these circumstances. If participation is
indeed purely voluntary, if all agreements are reviewable by civil
courts, if parties are already submitting to these panels informally
anyhow, and if any provision that violates the Canadian civil
rights laws is null and void, what do Muslim and feminist groups
find so appalling? At worst, some kind of toothless sharia-lite will
govern. At best, a more equitable, kinder, gentler sharia may be
204
forged.
The application of religious personal law in Israel and India
suggests these observations are wrong. In neither country have
religious laws been significantly modified due to civil court
supervision.
Civil court review of religious law or religious
tribunals is more complicated than ordinary judicial review of lower
courts by hierarchically superior courts because the introduction of
the religious element creates a situation in which different sources of
legal authority must face off. From the internal perspective of
secular law, authority derives from acts of the legislature and the
civil courts. From the internal perspective of religious law, authority
derives from a higher power. Therefore, even if in theory the
human rights norms of the state's constitution or procedural
requirements imposed by statutes are the highest law of the land as in India and Israel - from the perspective of religious law and its
supporters, there is yet a higher law, and the demands of secular
law may be viewed as less than binding, optional, or even
forbidden. In other words, religious law itself operates as a type of
constitutional law against which the validity of all other laws may
be tested. Putting civil courts in the position of mediating between
these clashing sources of authority is problematic because the civil
courts' own authority clearly derives from the secular law; their
social legitimacy as impartial interpreters on religious questions
may be called into question, particularly when they venture directly
into religious interpretation, as in Shah Bano and the Hindutva cases.
Another lesson from the experience of Israel and India is that
social groups who see themselves as the primary beneficiaries of the
204. Dahlia Lithwick, How Do You Solve the Problem of Sharia?, SLATE, Sept. 10,
2004, availableat http://www.slate.com/id/2106547/.
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religious legal system - such as Israeli Orthodox Jews and Indian
Muslims - become politically invested in the continued autonomy
and preservation of the system. Attempts to reform or restrain the
system from the outside (e.g., by the civil courts or the legislature)
are likely to be interpreted as attacks on these groups' religious
rights. That perception leads to magnified social tension and
conflict around civil court cases implicating religious law, and
makes outside supervision and management of religious legal
systems complex and fraught with potential controversy. This type
of fundamental and irreconcilable social tension is not conducive to
democracy because the rationale for maintaining a democratic state
depends on the state's citizens perceiving some form of a common
political-legal identity.
A final lesson may be drawn from the historical persistence of
religious law in Israel and India. These pluralist systems of law had
their origin as political concessions to local communities being ruled
by foreign imperial powers, and have long outlasted the empires
themselves. Although the prevailing political and social conditions
have changed, and modern India and Israel are in many ways
radically different from the Ottoman and British eras, the systems of
religious authority persist. Once these legal systems gained the
backing of the state as vehicles for the autonomy of certain
communities, they have proved remarkably rooted, selfperpetuating, and resistant to reform, surviving changes of
government, revolutions, partitions, and wars. Therefore, any
secular, democratic state that is considering adopting a version of
religious legal pluralism should carefully weigh the costs and
benefits of doing so, since that decision may be with them for a long
time to come.

